Ontologies and Domain Theories

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Abstract
Although there is consensus that a formal ontology consists of a set of axioms within some logical language, there is little consensus on how a formal ontology differs from an arbitrary theory. There is an intuitive distinction between the formal ontology and the set of domain theories that use the ontology, but there has been no characterization of this distinction in the context of first-order ontologies. In this paper we utilize the notions of definable sets and types from model theory mathematical logic to provide a semantic characterization of the domain theories for an ontology. We illustrate this approach with respect to several formal ontologies from mathematical logic and knowledge representation.

1 Motivation
Ontological engineering was born with the promise of reusability, integration, and interoperability. Of increasing importance are the problems merging ontologies from different domains and translating among multiple ontologies from the same domain. An obstacle to achieving this vision has been a lack of consensus over the nature of the axioms within a formal ontology. On the one hand, formal ontologies are specific theories – we are not defining new languages or logics. On the other hand, formal ontologies are different from arbitrary theories in that we intuitively think of ontologies as being the reusable portion of domain theories. This begs the question of defining domain theories, and it raises the perennial debate of the difference between ontologies and knowledge bases.

In the course of providing a formal characterization of domain theories for ontologies, we are guided by several intuitions.

- Domain theories and queries are constructed using ontologies – typical reasoning problems include sentences that describe a particular scenario in addition to the axioms of the ontologies.
- Ontologies are the reusable parts of domain theories, in the sense that all domain theories for an ontology are extensions of a unique set of axioms in the ontology.
- In semantic interoperability scenarios, software applications exchange sentences that are written using ontologies, rather than exchange axioms from the ontologies themselves.

The objective of this paper to is to provide a semantic characterization of domain theories, that is, one that is based on properties of the models of the formal ontology.

1.1 Some Motivating Examples
We consider several ontologies and the sentences that are intuitively their domain theories. We begin with two mathematical theories which are well understood before moving on to two ontologies from the knowledge representation community.

Algebraically Closed Fields Suppose that two software applications share the ontology of algebraically closed fields (Hodges 1993), for example, CAD software that is based on algebraic geometry. Such software applications will exchange shapes that are specified by polynomials; they are not exchanging axioms in the ontology. In this case, we can see that the domain theories for algebraically closed fields are polynomials.

Groups Domain theories for the ontology of groups (Hodges 1993) are either explicitly specifying particular groups or subgroups of other groups. A group presentation defines a group by specifying a set of elements of a group (known as generators) such that all other elements of the group can be expressed as the product of the generators subject to a set of equations (known as relations among the generators). For example, the group presentation for the cyclic group of order three is the equation $a \cdot a \cdot a = 1$, and it is equivalent to the theory of the group with respect to the element $a$ in the domain.

Time Ontologies Consider an ontology of time $T_{dense}$ (Hayes 1996) in which the set of timepoints is linearly ordered and dense. Such an ontology is typically used to specify the underlying constraints in commonsense reasoning problems about events (e.g. “Bob left home before arriving at work and Alice arrived at work after Bob”). This set of constraints constitutes a domain theory for the ontology $T_{dense}$; in general, the domain theories consist of boolean combinations of sets of timepoints that form intervals on the linear ordering.
Situation Calculus  The axiomatization of situation calculus in (Reiter 2001) includes a set of foundational axioms (the ontology \(T_{sitcalc}\)) together with a set of axioms which plays the role of a domain theory.

A simple state formula is a formula which contains a unique situation variable and which contains only holds literals. A precondition axiom for an activity \(A\) is a sentence of the form
\[
(\forall s) \text{poss}(A, s) \supset Q(s)
\]
where \(Q(s)\) is a simple state formula. An effect axiom for an activity \(A\) is a sentence of the form
\[
(\forall s) Q_1(s) \supset \text{holds}(F, \text{do}(A, s))
\]
where \(Q(s)\) is a simple state formula and \(F\) is a fluent. Basic action theories, which consist of sets of precondition and effect axioms, are domain theories for situation calculus.

2 Domain Theories and Definable Sets
The characterization of ontologies and domain theories rests on the model-theoretic notion of definability. After introducing this notion, we will use it to distinguish between the different classes of theories within an ontology.

2.1 Definable Sets
We will adopt the following definition from (Marker 2002):

**Definition 1** Let \(M\) be a structure in a language \(L\).

A set \(X \subseteq M^n\) is definable in \(M\) iff there is a formula \(\varphi(v_1, \ldots, v_n, w_1, \ldots, w_m)\) of \(L\) and \(\overline{B} \in M^m\) such that
\[
X = \{\overline{a} \in M^n : M \models \varphi(\overline{a}, \overline{b})\}
\]

\(X\) is \(A\)-definable if there is a formula \(\varphi(\overline{a}, w_1, \ldots, w_l)\) and \(\overline{B} \in A^l\) such that
\[
X = \{\overline{a} \in M^n : M \models \varphi(\overline{a}, \overline{b})\}
\]

We say that \(X\) is \(\emptyset\)-definable if \(A = \emptyset\). If \(A\) is nonempty, we say that \(X\) is definable with parameters.

**Example 1** Suppose \(M\) is a discretely ordered ring.

The set of even numbers is \(\emptyset\)-definable in \(M\):
\[
\{x : (\exists y) x = y + y\}
\]
The set of prime numbers is \(\emptyset\)-definable in \(M\):
\[
\{x : (\forall y, z) (y \cdot z = x) \supset (y = x) \lor (z = x)\}
\]
The set
\[
\{x : a_0 + a_1x + a_2x^2 + \ldots + a_nx^n = 0\}
\]
is definable with parameters \(a_0, \ldots, a_n\).

2.2 Definitional Extensions and Core Theories
An ontology is specified by a set of axioms in some formal language. Nevertheless, this is not an amorphous set, and the notion of definability allows us to distinguish between different kinds of sentences within an ontology.

**Definition 2** A theory \(T_1\) is a definitional extension of a theory \(T\) iff every constant, function, and relation in models of \(T_1\) is \(\emptyset\)-definable in models of \(T\).

It is easy to see that a definitional extension of a theory \(T\) is also a conservative extension of \(T\), although the converse is not true; that is, there are conservative extensions of theories which are not definitional extensions.

**Definition 3** A theory \(T_{\text{core}}\) is a core theory iff no constant, function, or relation in models of \(T_{\text{core}}\) is definable in the models of any other theory.

Combining these two classes of sentences gives us the following definition of an ontology.

**Definition 4** An ontology \(T_{\text{onto}}\) is a theory consisting of a set of core theories and a set of definitional extensions.

Intuitively, the core theories axiomatize the primitive functions and relations in the ontology. If a core theory in an ontology is an extension of some other core theories in the ontology, then it is a nonconservative extension.

In the case of the PSL Ontology (Gruninger & Kopena 2004), the definitional extensions within the ontology are axiomatizations of the classes of activities and activity occurrences that correspond to values of the invariants that are used to classify the models of the core theories within the ontology.

If we consider the examples from Section 1.1, we can see that an ontology is not an arbitrary set of sentences. In the case of algebraically closed fields, polynomials are sentences that are not in a core theory or definitional extension. Similarly, precondition and effect axioms are not part of a core theory or definitional extension. We therefore require a precise definition of the class of sentences that correspond to domain theories.

2.3 Domain Theories
We are still faced with the question of how domain theories are different from the other two classes of theories within an ontology. Whereas a definitional extension is an axiomatization of the \(\emptyset\)-definable sets in a model of an ontology \(T_{\text{onto}}\), we will say that a domain theory for an ontology \(T_{\text{onto}}\) is an axiomatization of sets that are definable with parameters in some model of \(T_{\text{onto}}\).

**Definition 5** A theory \(T_d\) is a domain theory for an ontology \(T_{\text{onto}}\) iff every formula in \(T_d\) defines a set \(X \subseteq M^n\) with parameters in some model \(M\) of \(T_{\text{onto}}\).

In general, domain theories are not conservative extensions of the ontology. For example, the domain theory consisting of the equations
\[
(a \cdot (a \cdot a)) = 1
\]
in the theory of groups entails the sentence
\[
(\exists x, y) (\{(x \cdot y) = (y \cdot x)\} \land (x \neq 1) \land (y \neq 1))
\]
which is not entailed by the axioms in the theory of groups alone.

On the other hand, domain theories are distinct from arbitrary nonconservative extensions of the ontology. For example, the sentence
\[
(\forall x, y) (x \cdot y) = (y \cdot x)
\]
axiomatizes abelian groups; it forms a nonconservative extension of the theory of groups, yet we would not consider it.
to be a domain theory, since it does not define any sets with parameters in some model of group theory.

This approach to characterizing the sentences in an ontology generalizes a distinction long made within the description logic community – sentences in the ABox are domain theories, subsumption axioms in the TBox are contained in core theories, and equivalence axioms are part of the definitional extensions of the ontology.

3 Domain Theories and Types

The next step is to show how the set of domain theories for an ontology can be characterized with respect to properties of the models of the ontology. This will allow us to formalize the intuitions presented earlier in Section 1.

3.1 Types

Types describe a model of a theory from the point of view of a single element or a finite set of elements ([Marker 2002], [Rothmaler 2000]).

**Definition 6** Let $\mathcal{M}$ be a model for a language $\mathcal{L}$. The type of an element $a \in M$ is defined as $\text{type}_{\mathcal{L}}(a) := \{ \phi : \phi$ is a formula of $\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{M} \models \phi(a) \}$. An n-type for a theory $T$ is a set $\Phi(x_1, ..., x_n)$ of formulae, such that for some model $\mathcal{M}$ of $T$, and some n-tuple $\pi$ of elements of $\mathcal{M}$, we have $\mathcal{M} \models \phi(\pi)$ for all $\phi \in \Phi$.

If $t$ is an n-type, then a model $\mathcal{M}$ realizes $t$ iff there are $a_1, ..., a_n \in \mathcal{M}$ such that $\mathcal{M} \models t(a_1, ..., a_n)$.

A type $p$ is a complete n-type iff $\phi \in p$ or $\neg \phi \in p$ for any formula $\phi$ with $n$ free variables; a partial type is a type that is not complete.

Informally, the type for an element in a model is a set of formulae which are satisfied by the element in the model. An n-type for a theory is a consistent set of formulæ (each of which has $n$ free variables) which is satisfied by a model of the theory.

3.2 Characterization Theorems for Domain Theories

The model-theoretic notion of type allows us to formalize the intuition that domain theories are theories about elements in the domain of a model of the ontology.

**Theorem 1** A set of sentences $T_{dt}$ is a domain theory for an ontology $T_{onto}$ iff it is logically equivalent to a boolean combination of finite partial n-types for $T_{onto}$.

**Proof:** $\Rightarrow$) Let $\varphi(x_1, ..., x_n)$ be a sentence in a domain theory for $T_{onto}$ and let

$$\{ \pi : \mathcal{M} \models \varphi(\pi) \}$$

be the set defined by this sentence in a model $\mathcal{M}$ of $T_{onto}$. It is easy to see that this set realizes the finite n-type $\varphi(x_1, ..., x_n)$ in $\mathcal{M}$.

$\Leftarrow$) The set of elements that realize a finite type in $\mathcal{M}$ constitute a definable set. The boolean combination of finite partial n-types is equivalent to the union, intersection, complement, and projection of definable sets, and these operations preserve definable sets. Therefore, the boolean combination of n-types is logically equivalent to a domain theory. $\square$

This result shows that we can specify all possible domain theories for an ontology by identifying the finite partial types for elements in the models of the ontology.

Not all types correspond to domain theories, since a type that consists of an infinite set of formulæ may not be first-order definable. For example,

$$\{ 0 < c, S(0) < c, S(S(0)) < c, ... \}$$

is an infinite type that is realized by a nonstandard number $c$ in a model of $Th(\mathbb{N}, 0, S, <)$, yet the set is not first-order definable in the theory.

The next two theorems characterize domain theories with respect to the models of the ontology, and formalize the intuition that ontologies are the reusable parts of domain theories, in the sense that all domain theories for an ontology are extensions of a unique set of axioms in the ontology.

**Theorem 2** If $T_{dt}$ is a domain theory for an ontology $T_{onto}$ then there exists a model $\mathcal{M}$ of $T_{onto}$ such that

$$T_{onto} \cup T_{dt} \subseteq Th(\mathcal{M})$$

**Proof:** By Definition 5, the sentences in $T_{dt}$ define sets with parameters in some model $\mathcal{M}$ of $T_{onto}$. We therefore have

$$T_{onto} \subseteq Th(\mathcal{M})$$

Suppose that there is a sentence $\Sigma \in T_{dt}$ such that $\Sigma \notin Th(\mathcal{M})$. In this case, we must have $\mathcal{M} \models \neg \Sigma$, which would mean that $\Sigma$ does not define a set in $\mathcal{M}$, and hence would not be a sentence in a domain theory. We therefore also have

$$T_{dt} \subseteq Th(\mathcal{M})$$

$\square$

From this result we can see that models of a domain theory are models of the ontology.

**Theorem 3** For any model $\mathcal{M}$ of $T_{onto}$, there exists a domain theory $T_{dt}$ for $T_{onto}$ such that

$$T_{onto} \cup T_{dt} \subseteq Th(\mathcal{M})$$

**Proof:** Since $\mathcal{M}$ is a model of $T_{onto}$, we have

$$T_{onto} \subseteq Th(\mathcal{M})$$

If $T_{dt}$ is the set of sentences that define sets in $\mathcal{M}$, then $T_{dt} \neq \emptyset$ (since any finite set is definable). $T_{dt}$ is therefore a domain theory such that

$$\mathcal{M} \models T_{dt}$$

As a result, we know that $T_{onto} \cup T_{dt}$ is consistent. Since $\mathcal{M} \models T_{onto} \cup T_{dt}$, we have

$$T_{onto} \cup T_{dt} \subseteq Th(\mathcal{M})$$

$\square$
Note that any definable set must have some axiomatization, whereas nondefinable sets cannot be axiomatized by any theory. Furthermore, every model contains definable sets (since finite sets are always definable). Consequently, domain theories will always exist for any ontology.

We can define a complete domain theory as one that satisfies

$$T_{onto} \cup T_{dt} = Th(M)$$

for some model $M$ of $T_{onto}$. In other words, a complete domain theory is an axiomatization of a particular model of the ontology. Not all ontologies will have complete domain theories. For example, there exist infinite groups that do not have a finite presentation. The standard models of more powerful ontologies, such as Peano Arithmetic and the theory of the free semigroups, are not axiomatizable, so that any domain theory in such cases would be incomplete.

3.3 Techniques for Specifying Domain Theories

Model theory provides several techniques for specifying the types for first-order theories. The most widely use technique is known as the elimination of quantifiers, in which one focuses on the sets that are definable by formulae that are quantifier-free.

A theory $T$ admits the elimination of quantifiers if for every formula $\phi$ there is a formula $\psi$ such that

$$T \models \phi \equiv \psi$$

One typically determines this by specifying a set of quantifier-free formulae $\Delta$ (known as the elimination set) such that for every formula $\phi$ in the language of $T$ there is a formula $\psi$ which is a boolean combination of formulae in $\Delta$, and $\phi$ is equivalent to $\psi$ in every model of $T$. It is easy to see that in ontologies that admit elimination of quantifiers, the elimination set characterizes the set of types.

Unfortunately, not all ontologies admit the elimination of quantifiers, and the characterization of the definable sets and types realized in models of these ontologies can become quite complicated.

3.4 Revisiting the Examples

The set of types for many ontologies within mathematical logic have been specified within the literature. We can see that the types for the ontologies that we considered in Section 1 do indeed correspond to the intuitions that we have about their domain theories.

Algebraically Closed Fields and Polynomials Since algebraically closed fields admit the elimination of quantifiers, it can be shown ([Marcja & Toffalori 2003]) that any irreducible polynomial corresponds to a complete 1-type and that 2-types correspond to algebraic curves. In other words, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of roots of polynomials (algebraic numbers) and definable elements in the models of $T_{field}$. There is also the complete 1-type that is realized by all numbers that are transcendental over models of the ontology; this type is not generated by a finite set of formulae, and hence does not correspond to a domain theory.

Presentations and Groups Although the theory of groups does not admit elimination of quantifiers, it can be shown that all 1-types for $T_{group}$ are of the form

$$(\exists y, z) \ x = y \cdot z$$

We can see that both presentations and group equations are domain theories for groups, since they are boolean combinations of 1-types. In a sense, the presentation is equivalent to the types realized by all elements of the group $G$; when a presentation exists, it is a complete axiomatization of the theory $Th(G)$ for the group.

Time Ontologies Models of $T_{dense}$ are isomorphic to dense linear orderings, whose n-types have been fully characterized in (Rosenstein 1982). The n-types for $T_{dense}$ are therefore boolean combinations of literals of the form $before(v_i, v_j)$ and $v_i = v_j$. Thus the types for dense linear orderings correspond to the domain theories discussed in Section 1.1.

Action Theories in Situation Calculus Although there has been no work on the characterization of the types for $T_{sitcalc}$ we can still show that action theories define sets in models of $T_{sitcalc}$, and so are domain theories for $T_{sitcalc}$.

The precondition axiom for each action $a$ is realized by the definable set of situations

$$\{s_1 : s_1 = do(a, s), (s_1) \in executable\}$$

that is, the set of executable situations that correspond to occurrences of $a$. The effect axiom for each action $a$ is realized by the definable set of situations

$$\{s_1 : s_1 = do(a, s), (f, s_1) \in holds \iff (f, s) \notin holds\}$$

that is, the set of situations that achieve or falsify specific fluents. A complete characterization of all types and domain theories for $T_{sitcalc}$ is an open research problem.

4 Evaluating the Ontology

We can evaluate the correctness and completeness of the ontology and domain theories with respect to the characterization of definable sets. For correctness, all domain theories for an ontology must be consistent with the ontology. For completeness, we need to determine whether or not there exist models of the ontology that do not realize any types corresponding to some class of domain theories.

Definition 7 Let $\Sigma$ be a set of types for a theory $T$. $T$ is definably complete with respect to $\Sigma$ iff every model of $T$ realizes some type in $\Sigma$.

In $T_{sitcalc}$, precondition axioms are domain theories, but not all activities realize precondition axioms i.e. there are other classes of domain theories.

Theorem 4 The ontology $T_{sitcalc}$ is not definably complete with respect to the set of basic action theories.

Proof: We can construct a model of $T_{sitcalc}$ that does not satisfy any basic action theory (i.e. set of precondition and effect axioms).
Let $s_1, s_2$ be situations in the situation tree that agree on state, that is, for any fluent $f$,

$$\langle f, s_1 \rangle \in \text{holds} \iff \langle f, s_2 \rangle \in \text{holds}$$

Now specify the extension of the $\text{poss}$ relation for an activity $a$ such that

$$\langle a, s_1 \rangle \in \text{poss}, \langle a, s_2 \rangle \not\in \text{poss}$$

The activity $a$ cannot realize any precondition axiom, since the same simple state formula is realized by both $s_1$ and $s_2$.

Now specify the extension of the $\text{holds}$ relation for the activity $a$ such that

$$\langle f, \text{do}(a, s_1) \rangle \in \text{holds}, \langle f, \text{do}(a, s_2) \rangle \not\in \text{holds}$$

The activity $a$ cannot realize any effect axiom, since the same simple state formula is realized by both $s_1$ and $s_2$.

On the other hand, the PSL Ontology explicitly axiomatizes the classes of activities that realize the types corresponding to basic action theories.  

**Theorem 5** Let $\text{MAA}$ (Markovian Activity Assumption) be the sentence

$$\forall a \text{activity}(a) \supset \text{markov\_precond}(a) \land \text{markov\_effect}(a)$$

The ontology $T_{\text{disc\_state}} \cup T_{\text{occtree}} \cup T_{\text{pslcore}} \cup \text{MAA}$ is definably complete with respect to the set of basic action theories.

It should be noted that $T_{\text{disc\_state}} \cup T_{\text{occtree}} \cup T_{\text{pslcore}}$ alone is not definably complete, since there are models that do not realize precondition and effect axioms; on the other hand, all models of $T_{\text{disc\_state}} \cup T_{\text{occtree}} \cup T_{\text{pslcore}} \cup \text{MAA}$ realize precondition and effect axioms.

It must be emphasized that one cannot specify domain theories using axiom schemata – there will typically be mutually inconsistent domain theories for the same ontology, yet the union of sentences that are instantiations of an axiom schema must be consistent. For example, both of the following sentences satisfy the syntactic definition of precondition axioms in situation calculus

$$\forall s \text{poss}(A, s) \supset \text{holds}(F, s)$$

$$\forall s \text{poss}(A, s) \supset \neg \text{holds}(F, s)$$

yet they are mutually inconsistent.

We can also use this approach to show that some approaches to process ontologies are in fact specifying classes of domain theories rather than ontologies. For example, the axiomatization of actions and events in (Allen & Ferguson 1994) does not include any core theories or definitional extensions; it only contains a specification of the classes of sentences that constitute event definitions, action definitions, and event generation axioms.

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**5 Classifying Domain Theories**

We can use the notion of definable completeness of an ontology to classify the domain theories for the ontology. In particular, we can classify domain theories with respect to the sets that are $\emptyset$-definable by the sentence $\Phi$ such that $T_{\text{onto}} \cup \Phi$ is definably complete with respect to the domain theories.

For example, by Theorem 5, $T_{\text{disc\_state}} \cup T_{\text{occtree}} \cup T_{\text{pslcore}} \cup \text{MAA}$ is definably complete; activities in the set defined by the sentence $\text{MAA}$ realize the types corresponding to basic action theories. Activities that do not belong to the set (that is, activities that do not satisfy the sentence $\text{MAA}$) do not realize the types corresponding to basic action theories. This gives a model-theoretic definition of basic action theories, rather than simply a syntactic definition.

Within the PSL Ontology, sentences such as $\text{MAA}$ axiomatize invariants that are used to classify the models of the core theories (Gruninger & Kopena 2004). Invariants are properties of models that are preserved by isomorphism. For some classes of structures, invariants can be used to classify the structures up to isomorphism; for example, vector spaces can be classified up to isomorphism by their dimension. For other classes of structures, such as graphs, it is not possible to formulate a complete set of invariants. Nevertheless, even without a complete set, invariants can still be used to provide a classification of the models of a theory.

In general, the set of models for the core theories of an ontology are partitioned into equivalence classes defined with respect to the set of invariants of the models. Each equivalence class in the classification of the models of the ontology is axiomatized using a definitional extension of the ontology. Each definitional extension in the ontology is associated with a unique invariant; the different classes of objects that are defined in an extension correspond to different properties of the invariant. In this way, the terminology of the ontology arises from the classification of the models of the core theories with respect to sets of invariants.

Using this approach, the classification of domain theories mirrors the classification of the models of the core theories, as well as the organization of the definitional extensions within the ontology.

**6 Reasoning Problems**

Many reasoning problems with ontologies (such as decision problems for mathematical theories) incorporate domain theories as well as the set of axioms in the ontologies themselves.

The Word Problem in group theory is specified for a particular group and it requires both the axioms for groups as well as the presentation for the group:

$$T_{\text{group}} \cup \Sigma_{\text{presentation}} \models (w = 1)$$

The query in this case determines whether the product of group elements $w$ is equal to the identity element in the group.

In a temporal reasoning problem, we consider a particular scenario of temporal constraints in addition to the axioms for...
the time ontology, and determine whether or not a particular
 temporal constraint is entailed by the scenario:

\[ T_{\text{time}} \cup \Sigma_{\text{scenario}} \models \text{before}(T_1, T_2) \]

For situation calculus, the antecedent of a reasoning prob-
lem such as planning includes basic action theories, while
the query sentence is an existentially quantified simple state
formula:

\[ T_{\text{sitcalc}} \cup \Sigma_{\text{action}} \models (\exists s) Q(s) \]

In general, an entailment problem for an ontology \( T_{\text{onto}} \)
has the form

\[ T_{\text{onto}} \cup \Sigma_{\text{dt}} \models \Sigma_{\text{query}} \]

where \( \Sigma_{\text{dt}} \) is a domain theory for \( T_{\text{onto}} \) and \( \Sigma_{\text{query}} \) is a sen-
tence in the language of the ontology. This leads to the next
 question – what class of sentences in the language of the
ontology characterize the query?

Any sentence in such a query (that is, a sentence in
\( \Sigma_{\text{query}} \)) can also be considered to be a domain theory. For
example, in the word problem for groups, the query sentence
is a group equation, which is a type for the theory of groups.
Similarly, simple state formulae are types for fluents in situa-
tion calculus.

We can provide a model-theoretic characterization of
queries using the following notion:

**Definition 8** A type \( p \) is isolated iff there is a formula \( \varphi \in p \)
such that for any \( \psi \in p \), we have

\[ T \models (\forall \tau) \varphi(\tau) \supset \psi(\tau) \]

Queries therefore correspond to nonisolated types for the
ontology. Using this definition, we can also consider queries
to be weak domain theories, in the sense that they are en-
tailed by other domain theories. We can therefore apply the
earlier techniques for arbitrary domain theories to provide a
characterization of the possible queries in reasoning prob-
lems that use a particular ontology.

The same techniques that were used to characterize all
possible domain theories for an ontology by specifying the
types for the ontology can be used to characterize the queries
by specifying the nonisolated types for the ontology. We can
also classify the queries for an ontology by characterizing
the additional sentences that are required in order for an on-
tology to be definably complete with respect to the class of
queries.

7 Summary

Although there is an intuitive distinction between the formal
ontology and the set of domain theories that use the ontol-
ogy, there has been no characterization of this distinction.
In this paper we have utilized the notions of definable sets and
types from model theory mathematical logic to provide a se-
manic characterization of the domain theories for an ontol-
ogy that gives a clear logical distinction between ontologies and
domain theories.

Domain theories for an ontology are the axiomatization of
definable sets in models of the ontology. This is equivalent
to saying that a domain theory for an ontology is a boolean
combination of finite partial n-types for the ontology.

The model-theoretic characterization of domain theories
serves as an evaluation criterion for ontologies, which can in
turn be used to classify the domain theories for an ontology.

This approach lays the groundwork for a comprehen-
sive methodology for the evaluation of formal ontologies by
specifying the complete sets of n-types that are realized in
models of the ontologies.

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