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François Lévy and J. Joachim Quantz

Representing Beliefs in a Situated Event Calculus.

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Overview of interactions

N:o Question Answer(s) Continued discussion
1 7.1  General discussion (7.1)
7.1  J. Joachim Quantz
2 7.1  Erik Sandewall
7.1  J. Joachim Quantz

Q1. General discussion (7.1):

What you call "situations" in your approach does not appear to be similar to situations as used in situation calculus. So what are they? Can they be understood as "histories", so that  Holds-at(pts should be read as saying that  p  is true at time  t  in the history  s ?

A1. J. Joachim Quantz:

Yes, but notice that the set of situations or histories is branching, so that two situations/ histories may be identical up to a point in time, and differ from there on.

Q2. Erik Sandewall:

I like this; it allows us to reason about alternative futures with a moderate extension of the previous machinery. However, one obvious limitation is that beliefs can only be expressed relative to objective timepoints. There is no way of representing believed time. Do you have any suggestion about how the proposed framework can be extended so as to make this possible?

A2. J. Joachim Quantz:

This is a topic for our further research.

This on-line debate page is part of a discussion at recent workshop; similar pages are set up for each of the workshop articles. The discussion is organized by the area Reasoning about Actions and Change within the Electronic Transactions on Artificial Intelligence (ETAI).

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